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Abstract What factors should be taken into account
when attributing criminal responsibility to perpetrators
of severe crimes? We discuss the Breivik case, and the
considerations which led to holding Breivik accountable
for his criminal acts. We put some pressure on the view
that experiencing certain psychiatric symptoms or re-
ceiving a certain psychiatric diagnosis is sufficient to
establish criminal insanity. We also argue that the pres-
ence of delusional beliefs, often regarded as a key factor
in determining responsibility, is neither necessary nor
sufficient for criminal insanity.
Keywords Delusions .Moral responsibility . Criminal
insanity
Crime and Psychiatric Diagnosis
Has the Breivik case taught us anything about the rela-
tionship between psychiatric diagnosis and responsibility
for criminal action? In July 2011, Anders Breivik killed
77 people in Norway. In August 2012, he was sentenced
to 21 years in prison. As part of his first psychiatric
evaluation, conducted by Torgeir Husby and Synne
Sørheim, he was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia
and some of his most implausible beliefs were regarded
as persistent, systematised, bizarre delusions. For in-
stance, one belief he reported is that he was the leader
of a Knights Templar organisation which, according to
the Norwegian police, does not actually exist.
If it had been shown that Breivik experienced psy-
chotic symptoms at the time of his crime, then he would
have faced trial with a diagnosis of psychosis, and he
would not have been regarded as accountable for his
actions. This is because, in the Norwegian Criminal
Procedure Code, when one has psychotic symptoms,
one cannot be attributed criminal responsibility for ac-
tion: “a person is not criminally accountable if psychot-
ic, unconscious, or severely mentally retarded at the
time of the crime” ([1], page 17). For the Norwegian
Code, what psychosis involves is determined by the
current diagnostic manuals, and in DSM-IV it was de-
fined as the presence of hallucination or delusions; in the
wider definition, bizarre behaviour and speech were also
included. If Breivik’s diagnosis of a psychotic disorder
had been confirmed based on his symptoms, he would
have been regarded as “criminally insane” and sen-
tenced to compulsory psychiatric treatment.
The Norwegian court system employs the biolog-
ical principle, which means that the presence of
psychosis at the time a crime is committed will
automatically result in a ruling of insanity,
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independent of the intent of the perpetrator. Any
justified doubt in this regard should favour insanity.
([2], p. 2413)
However, this first assessment leading to the diagno-
sis of schizophrenia was overruled by a second assess-
ment, conducted by Agnar Aspaas and Terje Tørrissen,
according to which Breivik’s strange beliefs were not
psychotic symptoms in the context of schizophrenia or
of some other psychotic disorder, but could be explained
by a personality disorder. Based on the fact that he never
manifested hallucinations or Schneiderian first-rank
symptoms, this second pair of assessors rejected the
diagnosis of schizophrenia previously given to Breivik
and described his behaviour as caused by a narcissistic
personality disorder accompanied by pathological lying.
Phenomena that had been interpreted as negative symp-
toms of schizophrenia in the earlier assessment (emo-
tional disturbances, indifference, social withdrawal)
were given a different explanation [1]. As a result of
the second assessment and his new diagnosis, Breivik
was held accountable for his actions because he was
thought not to have been psychotic at the time of his
criminal act. In Norwegian Law the connection between
psychiatric symptoms and attributions of responsibility
is very direct: if one is found to have had psychotic
symptoms at the time of one’s criminal acts, one is not
held responsible for those acts.
Some have suggested that the Breivik case is not
dissimilar from the case of David Copeland, known as
the London Nail Bomber, who killed 3 people and
injured 139 by using homemade nail bombs in a series
of attacks in April 1999. At Copeland’s trial, experts
were also divided over whether he should be given a
diagnosis of schizophrenia or of personality disorder [3].
He pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of
diminished responsibility, but he was convicted of mur-
der and given six concurrent life sentences.
In English Law, the McNaughton Rules specify when
one is not to be held responsible for one’s actions due to
mental illness. Such rules rely on one not knowing the
quality or nature of the act, not knowing that it was
wrong, and being under an “insane delusion” that pre-
vents the appreciation of the true nature or quality of the
act. This is only an admissible defence in cases of murder.
Given the fairly high threshold, in homicide cases, the
diminished responsibility defence is often used instead.
For the diminished responsibility defence to apply, it is
not sufficient to demonstrate that there is an abnormality
of mind. This abnormality must be due to development,
injury, or illness, and must impair responsibility for ac-
tions “substantially”, as judged by individual medical
experts and juries. In schizophrenia, for example, we
know that, at a group level, there are cognitive and
neuropsychological impairments, even when patients
are remitted and taking medication. However, it is not
always easy to establish without further testing whether
such impairments affect a given individual, and if so,
whether they interfere with that individual’s local, partic-
ular, and context-specific decisions in a “substantial”way.
John Gunn [4], one of the psychiatric experts at the
Copeland trial, argues that there was no doubt that
Copeland had severe schizophrenia (a diagnosis also
confirmed by the team at the Hospital where Copeland
had previously received treatment), but the court still
favoured the view that Copeland was responsible for his
crimes.
On many occasions due deference is given by
lawyers and jurymen to medical opinion, thus
conferring apparent power to psychiatrists. This
is an illusion because the power is on loan and can
be withdrawn when the politics of a case, usually a
high profile case, demand it. The mental-
abnormality excuse used to mitigate many crimes
of homicide is not available for cases deemed
inexcusable by the newspapers, politicians and
public opinion. If by some skilful advocacy an
‘inexcusable’ crime is excused, then a public out-
cry occurs after the trial. ([4], page 62)
Why did Breivik’s psychiatric evaluation change? [5]
Were there similar pressures as those identified by
Gunn in the Copeland case? Some feel that the psychia-
trists responsible for the first evaluation made a mistake
and they did not take into account the right-wing context
in which Breivik’s assertions were made [2]. As a result,
the first assessors emphasised the implausibility and
idiosyncrasy of Breivik’s beliefs.
Another interpretation of the case, favoured by Ingrid
Melle [1], is that Breivik had schizophrenia all along, but
his symptoms were less florid at the time of the second
interview, which occurred several months after the
crime. The psychiatrists involved in his second assess-
ment found that Breivik had taken distance from many
of his wildest claims – for instance, he himself suggested
that he just wanted to believe that he had played a
leading role in the Knights Templar organisation. To
support this reading, one could suggest that a change
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of diagnosis on the basis that Breivik did not have
hallucinations or Schneiderian first-rank symptoms is
problematic, as these symptoms are not necessary for a
diagnosis of schizophrenia. Moreover, people with
narcissistic personality disorder do not experience any
psychotic symptoms, unless some other comorbid prob-
lem is also present. Further, one delusion was enough for
a diagnosis of psychosis in DSM-IV, even if not for a
diagnosis of schizophrenia (for instance, one could have
a psychotic disorder such as delusional disorder or an
affective psychosis), which means that if Breivik had
any delusions at all, then a diagnosis of psychosis would
have been legitimate.
There is a tension in the reaction of the public to
murderers such as Copeland and Breivik. On the one
hand, there is often a tendency to think that the killer
“must be mad” to commit such ominous crimes. On the
other hand, there is an overwhelming desire for retribu-
tion. The killer “must be punished” in the appropriate
way, and psychiatric treatment is not perceived as a
sufficient response to severe crimes. Retributivist intui-
tions and the desire to punish are strong and extremely
resistant to change. In cases of emotionally shocking
crimes they easily override the intuitions that (a) hor-
rendous crimes must be the consequence of some sort of
mental malfunctioning, and that (b) people with mental
illness may not be morally responsible for the crimes
they commit. When Simon Wessely commented upon
the Breivik case in the Lancet, he exposed two common
misconceptions about psychiatry. The first is that “out-
rageous crimes must mean mental illness”. The second
is that “the purpose of psychiatry is to get people off”
([6], page 1563). As Wessely suggests, these positions
are badly supported by evidence, blind us to the impor-
tant details of individual cases, and lead to excessively
polarised debates on mental health and moral and legal
responsibility for action.
Interpretations of the changes in diagnosis between
Breivik’s first and second psychiatric assessment differ,
but it seems likely that the public outcry at the thought
that Breivik might not be detained in jail for the crimes
he committed, and might be sentenced to compulsory
treatment instead, influenced the course of events. To-
gether with pressure from public opinion, other factors
might have contributed to the need for a second assess-
ment, including the fact that Breivik himself wanted to
be held responsible for his actions and was unhappy
about the diagnosis of schizophrenia and the prospect of
compulsory treatment. We do not argue for a specific
interpretation of the events, but want to discuss one
assumption made by many participants in this debate,
and by the Norwegian legal system itself, that having a
certain set of psychiatric symptoms or a particular diag-
nosis (e.g., psychotic symptoms or schizophrenia as
opposed to personality disorder) is sufficient by itself
to determine whether there is moral and legal responsi-
bility for (criminal) action. The Breivik case has
highlighted the need to develop a more local and nu-
anced view of responsibility and of the kind of punish-
ment that might be appropriate for criminal action. More
precisely, an argument is needed to support the claim
that the criteria used to discriminate schizophrenia from
personality disorder (e.g., the presence of delusions) are
also appropriate criteria for criminal insanity.
The assumption that people who have psychotic
symptoms or have received a diagnosis of schizophrenia
lack responsibility or have reduced responsibility for
action is especially problematic, as the behaviour of
two people with psychosis or schizophrenia can differ
almost entirely. Some people with schizophrenia are
able to function well, cognitively and socially, and to
control their delusions to some extent. Given this clini-
cal diversity, some authors (e.g., [7, 8]) have argued
those who have the diagnosis of schizophrenia make
up such a heterogeneous group empirically that the
diagnosis is not a good guide for research. Should it be
a good guide to determining responsibility for action?
The presence of psychiatric symptoms and of a diagno-
sis of schizophrenia should be taken into account in the
courtroom, but it should not be regarded as sufficient to
determine responsibility.
Delusional Beliefs
How can we establish whether a psychiatric condition
impairs the making of a specific decision leading to
criminal action? Neuroscience is making progress in
identifying brain lesions whichmay impair or contribute
to impairing normal decision-making, but the tech-
niques developed so far are not sophisticated enough
to allow inferences from present to past behaviour and
thus cannot be used in arguing for or against the claim
that a person was responsible for her action when she
committed a criminal act.
It is beyond the data generated from any currently
published scanning protocol to make predictions
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about the rational capacity (or lack thereof) of a
criminal defendant, or to make inferences as to
that defendant’s intent at a specific moment in
time before or during a specific criminal act. ([9],
page 41)
In the Breivik case, one key question for psychiatrists
involved in his assessment was whether his system of
beliefs was delusional. The presence of delusions alone
would have indicated lack of responsibility according to
the Norwegian Law. The psychiatrists who first assessed
Breivik were struck by some of the claims he made,
such as the claim that he was the ideological leader of a
Knights Templar organisation. Breivik was convinced
that this organisation existed and also reported to have
attended its founding ceremony in London in 2002.
Other bizarre beliefs he reported were that he would
soon become the new regent of Norway, and that he
could decide who was to live and die in the nation.
Given the content of such beliefs, he was originally
thought to have grandiose delusions. Although his
anti-Islamic and more generally racist views were
shared by others in some of the extremist groups he
associated with, beliefs about his specific role in present
and future cleansing projects seemed to be more mark-
edly delusional and idiosyncratic.
Examining the social context of a person’s beliefs is
important in a diagnostic setting as it is part of the
definition of delusions in the DSM that they are not
shared by the person’s community or sub-community.
Is the social context of a person’s beliefs also relevant
for the purposes of ascribing responsibility for action?
For claims about responsibility, the significance of the
fact that some of Breivik’s beliefs were not shared may
derive from the following consideration. If poor reality
testing (or some other relevant cognitive deficit associ-
ated with delusion formation) is affecting the beliefs he
is prepared to endorse to the extent that such beliefs are
implausible even to members of groups that are inclined
to share his political and ideological views, then maybe
such failure of reality testing (or other relevant cognitive
deficit) is also implicated in some of his decision mak-
ing processes, including those processes that led him to
his criminal acts. But this is just a hypothesis that needs
to be tested.
What we know about Breivik is that both the racist
and anti-Islamic beliefs held by extremist groups and his
own beliefs about his role in cleansing Norway from
undesirable people are epistemically bad, because they
are badly supported by evidence and insulated from
counter-evidence. They are also potentially dangerous,
because given their content they have the potential to
lead to decisions and actions that will cause harm to
others. Breivik had mundane racist and anti-Islamic
beliefs and, in addition to those, idiosyncratic beliefs
about a leading role in the cleansing project he was
committed to. In terms of providing some rationale for
his actions, both types of beliefs seem to be relevant to
his criminal actions, in the sense that we can see such
actions not as random acts of violence, but as consistent
with his belief system. The presence of delusional
beliefs as opposed to false, unjustified, and dangerous
beliefs does not seem to carry any special weight unless
it also signals the presence of some specific deficit in
decision making.
One further point is that, even if we combine them,
Breivik’s mundane racist beliefs and his more idiosyn-
cratic grandiose beliefs do not seem to provide sufficient
motivation for his actions. Breivik could have genuinely
believed that multiculturalism significantly harmed
Norwegian society (as many of themembers of extremist
groups do) and that he was in charge of an organisation
fightingmulticulturalism, without engaging in the actions
that led him to kill 77 people. Those thoughts could have
been channelled into joining a political party in which
such views were shared or campaigning against Muslims
and multiculturalism. In order to motivate murder, some
other beliefs needed to be in place, and attention should
be drawn to those, whether of a delusional nature or not.
In this respect, we want to draw a parallel with the case of
a young man with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who
attacked his neighbour after experiencing auditory hallu-
cinations about the neighbour making loud noise and
insulting him repeatedly.
[S]uppose Bill had actually had a very noisy
neighbor.What kind of ascription of responsibility
would we have made in relation to the harm
inflicted on his neighbor in those circumstances?
What kind of punishment would Bill have de-
served for his attacking his truly noisy neighbor?
Should the fact that the experiences were halluci-
natory (and thereby that the neighbor was not in
fact noisy) make a difference in relation to howwe
conceive of Bill’s responsibility for what he did
and of the punishment he deserves? It is true that
Bill was hallucinating: He was hallucinating that
his neighbour was making loud noises, and the
content of the hallucination explains in part why
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he attacked his neighbor. Had he not halluci-
nated that his neighbor was making loud
noises, Bill would have probably not attacked
and harmed his neighbor. But it is also true
that having noisy neighbors does not morally
justify assaulting them. That is, had Bill’s
neighbor been truly noisy, Bill would have
still been doing something blameable in
assaulting his neighbor. If one has a noisy
neighbor, then one should try to convince his
neighbor to be less noisy, and, failing that,
one should perhaps call the police. ([10],
page 182)
Here, what we find is that the psychotic symptoms
experienced by Bill help explain his aggressive behav-
iour towards his neighbour, although they are not suffi-
cient to motivate his actions. We believe the same type
of consideration could be applied to Breivik and other
mass murderers. They have beliefs that help explain
why they committed horrendous crimes, but such beliefs
alone should not be regarded as sole determinants for
their actions— their actions are not inevitable or excus-
able given their beliefs.
This seems to have consequences for the relationship
between delusions and criminal responsibility. The pres-
ence of delusions that help explain why one committed a
crime is not sufficient to regard the person who com-
mitted the crime unaccountable due to insanity, though
of course the presence of delusions is relevant to
the person’s full psychological profile at the time
the crime was committed and thus should be taken
into account.
Conclusions
We raised some preliminary concerns about the very
direct connection (openly acknowledged in Norwegian
law andmore implicit but still influential in English law)
between having a set of symptoms (e.g., psychotic
symptoms) or having a certain psychiatric diagnosis
(e.g., schizophrenia) and being held unaccountable for
one’s actions. People with the same diagnosis may
behave in very different ways and further information
about individual cases is required – especially informa-
tion about how impairments associated with one’s men-
tal illness may affect decision making more generally,
and specifically the making of the decisions which led
one to commit the crime.
Moreover, we made two suggestions about the pres-
ence of delusions, which is often considered as a key
criterion for criminal insanity. First, in terms of how
delusions motivate criminal action, the role of delusion-
al beliefs does not seem to be different from the role of
non-delusional beliefs, unless we assume that the pres-
ence of delusions also signals the presence of a cognitive
deficit that impacts on the decision to commit the crime
in question (and at present it would be difficult to find
empirical support for such a hypothesis). Second, hav-
ing beliefs that are epistemically bad and potentially
dangerous, whether delusional or not, is not always
sufficient to motivate criminal action. It may contribute
to an explanation for the crime, but does not make the
criminal action inevitable or excusable. Thus, the pres-
ence of delusions seems to be neither necessary nor
sufficient for criminal insanity.
Finally, reflection on the Breivik case and other sim-
ilar cases should promote the development of a more
nuanced view of responsibility for action, and of the
relationship between psychiatric symptoms (often as part
of a diagnosis) and criminal insanity. Such a notion of
responsibility would have countless benefits: it would be
theoretically stronger and better supported by the avail-
able evidence, and it would help us challenge the two
misconceptions that Wessely described, that “outrageous
crimes must mean mental illness” and that “the purpose
of psychiatry is to get people off”. These simplistic
conceptions are unfair to the mentally ill, who are
stigmatised as a result, and to psychiatrists, whose clin-
ical assessments and expert opinions are subject to sig-
nificant political pressures when high profile cases come
to the public attention.
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